CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1308
7 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THEIR JOINT DECLARATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE NPT

We have the honour to forward to you the text of a Declaration by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, in connection with the NPT. This Declaration will be made at the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995.

We should be grateful if you would kindly take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Gérard Errera
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of France to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed): Sir Michael Weston
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United Kingdom
to the Conference on
Disarmament

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States to
to the Conference on
Disarmament

GE.95-61131 (E)

DECLARATION BY FRANCE, RUSSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NPT

We wish to express our continuing strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), our desire that the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference in New York should decide on its indefinite and unconditional continuation in force and our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those in article VI.

We welcome the fact that the nuclear arms race has ceased and that, in keeping with the fundamental changes that have taken place with respect to international security, important steps have been taken towards nuclear disarmament, as a result of the agreements on deep reductions in the nuclear armaments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America as well as the significant reductions made by France and the United Kingdom in their nuclear weapon programmes.

We welcome the important progress made at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to which we are all contributing actively.

We also welcome the establishment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We urge that the negotiations begin forthwith.

We underline the importance of the harmonized security assurances which we have given to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the commitments as regards the provision of appropriate assistance to a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the NPT victim of aggression or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. We believe that these strengthen international peace and security.

We solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate goal.

We reaffirm our determination to continue to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and we pledge our support for its conclusion without delay.

We call upon all States Parties to the NPT to make the Treaty permanent. This will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in article VI.

We call upon all States that are not Parties to the NPT to accede to it soon, thereby contributing to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

A truly universal and fully implemented Treaty is in the interests of all.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1309
7 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE AND ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 APRIL 1995 FROM THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF CHINA'S NATIONAL STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the official Chinese and English text of "China's National Statement on Security Assurances", which was delivered on 5 April 1995 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

I would be grateful if the text of this statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Sha Zukang
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary for
Disarmament Affairs
Head of the Delegation of the
People's Republic of China to
the Conference on Disarmament

GE.95-61137 (E)

CHINA'S NATIONAL STATEMENT ON SECURITY ASSURANCES
5 April 1995

For the purpose of enhancing international peace, security and stability and facilitating the realization of the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China hereby declares its position on security assurances as follows:

1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances;

2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices;

3. China has always held that pending the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. China strongly calls for the early conclusion of an international convention on no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as an international legal instrument on assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

4. China, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council of the United Nations, undertakes to take action within the Council in order that the Council take appropriate measures to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, necessary assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that comes under attack with nuclear weapons, and impose strict and effective sanctions on the attacking State. This commitment naturally applies to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any non-nuclear-weapon State that has undertaken any comparable internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, in case of an aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against the State;

5. The "positive security assurance" provided by China, as contained in paragraph 4, does not in any way compromise China's position as contained in paragraph 3 and shall not in any way be construed as endorsing the use of nuclear weapons.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1310
CD/NTB/WP.236
7 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON THE CTBT NEGOTIATIONS

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item "Nuclear Test Ban" I have the pleasure in submitting herewith a Group of 21 Working Paper entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on the CTBT negotiations".

I would be grateful if this Working Paper could be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament as well as a Working Paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban.

(Signed): Satish Chandra

GE.95-61143 (E)

Statement of the Group of 21 on the CTBT negotiations

The Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular, the Nuclear Weapon States, for an early conclusion of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1995, made in CD/1292.

In this context, the Group of 21 notes with disappointment the stand taken by some Nuclear Weapon States on the fundamental article on "Scope" in the rolling text - CD/1273/Rev.1. Their continued support to "exceptions" to nuclear tests has resulted in little progress on this fundamental article. It raises the question about their commitment to the CTBT and goes against the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB. Furthermore, elaborating too vast a verification network also raises serious doubts about the direction and purpose of the present negotiations. It is obvious that the verification of a future CTBT should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the Treaty.

On the Scope of a CTBT, the Group of 21 had made it clear that the CTBT should be for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all times. The ban should be comprehensive and no tests should be carried out under any pretext for any reason or justification.

The G-21 is studying the contribution of the International Monitoring System (IMS) Expert Group presented in WP.224/225 as it is a valuable input for the negotiations. The G-21 has also noted the key political and technical issues raised by the Expert Group. The G-21 feels that the vast technical material already prepared by the experts on this subject in the past two years is a sufficient basis for delegations to take political decisions. The Group, therefore, feels that given the slow pace of the negotiations in Working Group 1, there does not appear to be much merit in holding more expert sessions. The experts could be a part of their national delegations. The time has now come to take political decisions in order to achieve progress in textual form in the rolling text.

The Group had made it clear in its earlier Working Papers that the verification system under the future CTBT should be cost-effective. The cost of the organization's activities including verification should be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the organization of a CTBT. Like the entire Treaty, the verification system should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and guarantee equal access to all States. Therefore, in view of the elaborate IMS system being proposed, the Group does not agree with the emphasis placed by some delegations on their "National Technical Means" to judge an ambiguous event. Hence, the Group reiterates its earlier position in CD/1266 that the Technical Secretariat should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing the data received from the IMS. The organization should be responsible for judgement in this regard. Therefore, the organization of a future CTBT should exchange and analyse all IMS and On-Site Inspection (OSI) data with this aim.

It is the Group's hope that the CTBT should be able to attract universal adherence. The Entry into Force (EIF) should not be complicated to delay the process. EIF made contingent upon ratification by the Nuclear Weapon States would make the CTBT hostage to them as well as a discriminatory treaty. The expansion of CD membership should also not be utilized as a pretext to delay the EIF.

In conclusion, the Group is concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations so far. The Group hopes that the pace of negotiations will be accelerated by an exhibition of political will by all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, especially on the "Scope", so that a CTBT can be concluded in 1995.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1311
10 April 1995

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION DATED 5 APRIL 1995 BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Please issue the necessary instructions for the attached declaration dated 5 April 1995 by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed) G. BERDENNIKOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to
the Conference on Disarmament

GE.95-61149 (E)

Declaration
by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation (5 April 1995)

Bearing in mind the fundamental significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, respectful of the legitimate desire of States parties to the Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons to receive assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and taking into account the provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, has been instructed to make the following declaration:

> "The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

In addition, we should like to emphasize that, as proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, efforts have been made to reach agreement on an updated resolution of the United Nations Security Council on security assurances for non-nuclear States. The draft of a resolution on this subject, prepared with the participation of Russian representatives, is being presented to the Security Council for consideration. The thrust of the draft is as follows.

In the event of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the permanent members of the Security Council - the nuclear-weapon States - will immediately bring the matter before the Council and will seek action by the Council to provide the necessary assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to the State that is a victim of an act of, or the object of the threat of, aggression.

Provision is also made for the possibility of taking appropriate measures in response to a request for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance from the victim of aggression, and also compensation from the aggressor for loss, damage or injury sustained by the State which is the victim of such an act of aggression as a result of the aggression.

We expect that the adoption of a resolution on this subject by the Security Council will be welcomed with satisfaction by the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that it will promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, international security and world stability.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1312
11 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MYANMAR ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Statement of the Group of 21 on Security Assurances.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for the distribution of this publication, under a CD number, to all member and participating non-member State delegations.

(Signed): U Aye
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.95-61167 (E)

STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

"It has come to the G 21 knowledge that a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on security assurances has been recently circulated in New York. The G 21 has carefully examined the proposals contained in that draft and would like to make the following preliminary observations.

1. Neither the Conference on Disarmament, nor any country belonging to G 21, has been associated with the drafting of the proposal, notwithstanding the fact that the CD is universally recognized as the sole multilateral negotiating disarmament body.

2. While taking into consideration the positive aspects of the proposal, the G 21 observes that this resolution does not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by Non-nuclear Weapon States on the restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided.

3. The G 21 reiterates its conviction that duly negotiated security assurances are a legitimate right of Non-nuclear Weapon States. In this context, it notes with disappointment that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has not even been re-established during the present session.

4. The Group considers that the terms of its Declaration of 31 March 1994, as reported in document CD/1256, remain valid and merit serious consideration. It is imperative that an unconditional multilaterally-negotiated and legally-binding convention on negative security assurances should be drafted and, to this end, all Members of the CD should display their political will.

5. In this regard, it is worth recalling the great importance that the Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries attach to a multilateral and legally-binding convention governing this issue as expressed during their tenth summit in Jakarta, in 1992, and reiterated by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers in Cairo, in May 1994, when they stated that 'security assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons could contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons' and 'called upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an internationally binding convention'.

6. At the same time, the G 21 considers it necessary that the Security Council gives positive assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States that should go beyond a mere reiteration of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

7. Furthermore, the G 21 reiterates its conviction that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should not be interpreted as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons.

8. The G 21 is deeply convinced that all aspects relating to nuclear weapons issues are interrelated and that the only effective security guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending which, it is for the Nuclear Weapon States to provide security assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally-binding form."

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1313
13 April 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ON THE ADOPTION ON 11 APRIL 1995 OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 984 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

I have the honour to forward to you the attached Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria on the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 on Security Assurances on 11 April 1995.

I would be most grateful if, in accordance with established procedure, this Declaration could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to all delegations participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Valentin DOBREV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria
Head of Delegation

GE.95-61175 (E)

DECLARATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ON THE ADOPTION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 984 ON SECURITY ASSURANCES

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the adoption by the United Nations Security Council on 11 April 1995 of Resolution 984 and the respective statements made by each of the nuclear weapon States on the security assurances of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes with appreciation the willingness of the five permanent members of the Security Council in case of aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, to bring the matter to the Security Council and to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, that is a victim, or an object of a threat of such aggression. This is a collective response to the aspirations of the States that have forsworn the nuclear weapons under this Treaty, to receive security assurances by the Security Council and its nuclear-weapon State permanent members.

Resolution 984 is a new step of progress on this important issue and an appropriate point of departure for negotiating a future legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

12 April 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1314
31 May 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 MAY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FORWARDING A STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ISSUED FOLLOWING THE EXPLOSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE BY CHINA ON 15 MAY 1995

The Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and requests it to distribute the following text on Thursday 1 June as an official document:

"The Argentine Republic associates itself with the strong international protest against the explosion of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China on 15 May. In that context, it deplores the attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China, which stands in contrast to the decision of the international community to move forward along the path of effective nuclear disarmament.

"The Chinese test is particularly regrettable in view of the occasion on which it was conducted - immediately after the Conference for the review and extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which reached agreement on the indefinite extension of the Treaty and on a declaration of principles, to which China assented, calling on States to 'exercise utmost restraint' with regard to nuclear tests.

"Nuclear explosions are not conducive to the early conclusion, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), which the international community has recognized as a priority objective for the strengthening of peace and security in the world."

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1315
2 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 15 MAY 1995, CONCERNING AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA

Attached is the text of a statement by the Press Secretary, issued by the Office of the Press Secretary of the White House on 15 May 1995, concerning an underground nuclear test conducted by China.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.95-61649 (E)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

May 15, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Today, China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in northwest China. The United States deeply regrets this action, coming only days after the successful conclusion of the NPT Extension Conference in New York where China agreed to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTB Treaty at the earliest possible time.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1316
7 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 1 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF TURKEY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY ON 17 MAY 1995 CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON 15 MAY 1995

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Turkey to the United Nations Office at Geneva and the other international organizations in Switzerland presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to communicate to it hereunder a translation of the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey on 17 May 1995 concerning the explosion of a nuclear device on the initiative of the People's Republic of China on 15 May 1995.

"The explosion of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China, which took place immediately after the decision on the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, is, leaving aside the doubts raised as to the proper application of the Treaty, a disappointment in the light of the work that has been carried out for the conclusion of a treaty which will completely prohibit nuclear tests.

"Turkey, which has already expressed its opinion in the past on the occasion of previous nuclear tests, wishes to express its profound concern once again at the harmful effects that the continuation of these tests may have for the environment, public health and safety, which are of fundamental importance for the future of mankind."

The Permanent Mission of Turkey would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would be kind enough to distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1317
7 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

NOTE VERBALE DATED 6 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT MADE BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 15 MAY 1995 IN CONNECTION WITH A NEW NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference and has the honour to forward a statement made by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 15 May 1995 in connection with the new nuclear test carried out by the People's Republic of China.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the secretariat would take appropriate steps to issue this statement as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

GE.95-61684 (E)

STATEMENT BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONCERNING THE NEW CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

According to information received, an underground nuclear test was carried out in China on 15 May 1995. This is the fourth nuclear explosion carried out in China in a period of over two years during which the other nuclear Powers have been exercising restraint and jointly observing the moratorium they have declared on such tests.

This action by China prompts regret and concern, all the more so as it was taken after the successful conclusion of the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in New York, which adopted by consensus the historic decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

Furthermore, this action is not conducive to the creation of a favourable atmosphere around the multilateral negotiations in Geneva concerning the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing.

It is to be hoped that China will reconsider its approach to nuclear tests and refrain from further testing. That would constitute a real contribution to the successful conclusion of the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and would promote the strengthening of international security.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1318
8 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 7 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE RESPONSE OF THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO THE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA ON 15 MAY 1995 AT LOP NOR

The New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and requests it to distribute the following text describing the response of the New Zealand Government and people to the underground nuclear weapon test conducted by China on 15 May at Lop Nor.

"The New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a public statement on 16 May in which he conveyed the sense of extreme shock felt by all New Zealanders at the news of the Chinese test. The Minister said that the action should be 'strongly condemned' coming as it did immediately after the decision in New York to make the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permanent.

"The New Zealand Government believes that China's failure to declare a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme runs counter to China's responsibility as a major Power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. There can be no justification for any testing, especially now that China and the other nuclear weapons States have agreed to a deadline for completion of this Conference's negotiations no later than 1996.

"The strong protest of the New Zealand Government and people has been conveyed directly to the Chinese authorities in both Beijing and Wellington. New Zealand has urged China to heed the many calls made in relation to this latest test and to announce a permanent moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of the CTBT and its entry into force."

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1319
15 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELGIUM TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY BELGIUM CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 15 MAY 1995

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement by Belgium concerning the Chinese nuclear explosion of 15 May 1995.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for it to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Baron Alain Guillaume
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.95-61902 (E)

STATEMENT BY BELGIUM CONCERNING THE CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST
OF 15 MAY 1995

On the occasion of the resumption of the work of the CD, the Government of Belgium would like to say how pleased it is at the success of the review and extension Conference for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty which has just taken place in New York. We believe that above and beyond the decision taken there to extend the Treaty indefinitely - thus securing the foundations of international security in the future - its success is due to the fact that the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were also adopted. These are designed to serve as guidelines for all our future activities and they also specify that the nuclear Powers should exercise "utmost restraint" with respect to nuclear tests. In the light of these principles, the fact that - on the very day after they were adopted by consensus - China proceeded to conduct a new nuclear test is absolutely shocking and indeed provocative, and my Government cannot but deplore this fact, for it runs truly counter to the spirit of our negotiations. At the same time, I would say that paradoxically this event, far from slowing down negotiations on the CTBT, underlines the urgent need for their completion. While regretting the event, let us therefore at the same time draw the lesson from it.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1320
15 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NEW ZEALAND ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. JIM BOLGER, TO THE NEW ZEALAND PARLIAMENT ON 14 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING ON MORUROA ATOLL IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The New Zealand Permanent Mission to the Office of the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to attach a statement by the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Jim Bolger, to the New Zealand Parliament on 14 June concerning the decision of the Government of France to resume nuclear weapon testing on Moruroa Atoll in the South Pacific.

The New Zealand Permanent Mission should be grateful if the Secretariat would distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

GE.95-61908 (E)

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING

STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

14 JUNE 1995

I am sure the House will wish to join with me in deploring the announcement by the French President this morning that France would be resuming nuclear testing in the Pacific.

The French Government is flouting world opinion if it goes ahead with a resumption of testing. President Chirac's decision runs counter to the outcome of the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference, at which the nuclear powers were asked to exercise "utmost restraint" in the lead-up to a test ban treaty.

The decision will be greeted with outrage by our neighbours in the South Pacific. We have already spoken to the Australians, current Chair of the South Pacific Forum, and we will be in touch with all the countries of the region to discuss what response the region can make as a whole. In recent years relations between France and the region have improved, following suspension of testing by President Mitterrand. This decision again calls into question France's role in the region.

The Government has taken every opportunity to make known its opposition to a resumption of testing. I have already told this House of the discussions I had in Paris with President Chirac prior to his taking office. Vice-President Gore was also present. I followed this up on my return to New Zealand by writing to President Clinton asking if the possibility of France sharing United States simulation technology could be explored. My understanding was that this would remove the need for further testing at Moruroa; it is unfortunate that the French authorities do not seem to have taken this possibility further.

I understand that it has been suggested by President Chirac that New Zealand had been informed in advance of his announcement that France was about to resume nuclear testing. This is not the case. We were not forewarned of the decision. As recently as last week our Ambassador in Paris made representations to the French authorities that they should not resume testing. Now that they have decided to resume, our Ambassador will be urging the French Government to reconsider. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has this morning spoken to the French Foreign Minister urging reconsideration.

As to steps that we will now take in response to the announcement, we have decided to freeze elements of our military cooperation with France other than in activities with a humanitarian purpose, such as search and rescue in the Pacific and United Nations peacekeeping. Among the activities involved are:

a planned visit by HMNZS Waikato, Endeavour and Wellington to Noumea in November;

a platoon exchange with French forces in New Caledonia in September;

a RNZAF Staff College visit to New Caledonia in September;

visits to New Zealand by French naval vessels and aircraft.

There will be a review of any military procurement activities involving French suppliers.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs will not proceed with a planned visit to New Caledonia for VJ Day commemorations. Contacts involving other Ministers will be reviewed.

On the multilateral front, it is my Government's intention to raise this issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In conjunction with our South Pacific Forum partners, we will also be looking at other ways of expressing our opposition, including at the United Nations in New York. We will of course take full advantage of other opportunities as they arise to register our views direct with the French Government.

Let me conclude by saying that it is not too late for France to reconsider its position. There is a great deal at stake. I am sure that I can speak for all members of this House, and for the people of New Zealand in urging the Government of France to reconsider its decision.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1321
16 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ITALY AS CURRENT WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A LETTER FROM THE FORMER WESTERN GROUP COORDINATOR ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN GROUP CONCERNING THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC'S APPLICATION FOR CD MEMBERSHIP

The Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference and - on behalf of the Group of Western Countries - has the honour to forward a letter addressed to the former CD President, Ambassador D.D.C. Don Nanjira, from the former Western Group Coordinator, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, concerning the Slovak Republic's application for CD membership.

The Permanent Mission of Italy would be grateful if the secretariat would take the appropriate steps to issue the above letter as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

GE.95-61931 (E)

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva, Switzerland

OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

7 June 1995

Dear Ambassador Don Nanjira,

I am writing to you on behalf of the Western Group of the Conference on Disarmament to inform you that the Group supports and endorses the Slovak Republic's application for CD membership.

The Western Group shares the view expressed by the Eastern Group in CD Document 1303 of 30 March 1995, that Slovakia's membership application has wide support within the CD and that Slovakia presents a unique case that is unrelated to the question of CD Membership Expansion.

On behalf of the Western Group, I request that the Slovak Republic's membership application, which has been before the CD for a considerable length of time, be decided without further delay.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Western Group Coordinator

Ambassador Dr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira
President of the Conference on Disarmament
Palais des Nations
Geneva

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1322
19 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 13 JUNE 1995, CONCERNING THE DECISION OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

Attached is the text of a statement by the Press Secretary of the White House, issued on 13 June 1995, which I referred to in my statement to the CD Plenary meeting of 15 June 1995, concerning the decision of France to resume nuclear testing.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.95-61957 (E)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

13 June 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

France announced today that it intends to resume nuclear testing. The United States regrets this action. We continue to urge all of the nuclear Powers, including France, to join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty at the earliest possible time. In this regard, we take note of President Chirac's strong commitment to end French testing no later than May 1996 and to sign a CTB Treaty no later than the fall of 1996. We will continue to work with France and all other States participating in the CTB negotiations to ensure that a Treaty is ready for signature as early as possible.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1323
19 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE ON THE RESUMPTION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS

Attached is the text of the official statement made by the Government of Chile on the resumption of French nuclear tests, which I request you to circulate as an official CD document.

(Signed) JORGE BERGUÑO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Chile
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.95-61963 (E)

Annex

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE

(Original: Spanish)

The Government of Chile expresses its rejection of the decision by France, announced yesterday by President Jacques Chirac, to resume nuclear tests for a limited period in the Mururoa atoll (South Pacific). This action is a serious threat to the conduct of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, an aspiration which is of the highest priority for our country, and a serious challenge to disarmament initiatives in general.

The Government of Chile, reiterating a constant principle of its foreign policy, appeals urgently to the Government of France to reconsider this decision in the interests of the protection of human life and the environment, as well as respect for the commitment of the international community in the areas of disarmament and world security.

Santiago, 14 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1324
19 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA EXPRESSING THE POSITION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Upon instruction, I have the honour to submit to you a press release from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia expressing the position of the Indonesian Government on the decision taken by the French Government to resume nuclear-weapon tests.

It would be highly appreciated, if you could take the necessary steps to include this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and at the same time to make it available to all member and non-member States participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Agus Tarmidzi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.95-61969 (E)

INDONESIA URGES FRANCE TO RECONSIDER DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

With regard to the recent announcement by the French Government that it would resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia finds such a decision regrettable as it does not conform in any way to the decision adopted during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the NPT which, among others, has urged the nuclear-weapon States to exercise utmost restraint.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the view that all States Parties to the NPT should take all necessary steps to promote a programme of action toward the realization of the universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996. In this respect the Government of the Republic of Indonesia appeals to the French Government to reconsider its decision to resume nuclear testing.

Jakarta, 14 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1325
20 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP, ISSUED ON 15 JUNE 1995, CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY FRANCE

Attached is the text of a statement by the current Chairman of the South Pacific Forum, the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP, issued on 15 June 1995, concerning the resumption of nuclear testing by France. The South Pacific Forum comprises the following Member States: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Richard Starr
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative for Disarmament Affairs

GE.95-61975 (E)

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP

On behalf of South Pacific Forum Heads of Government as current Chair of the Forum, I condemn France's decision to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Individual Forum Governments have already issued statements and protests that reflect the depth of their disappointment. The immediate widespread public antagonism to France's decision right across the South Pacific reflects the resentment felt by our peoples.

Forum Heads of Government understand and share these feelings. On their behalf, I express our unequivocal opposition to France's decision.

The statements that have been issued by other nuclear powers, and by other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world are welcome. Forum leaders hope that France will hear and take note of what the world is saying.

France has exercised a choice about the nature of its engagement in the South Pacific. Forum members had welcomed the improved relations between France and countries in the region. France's decision is a major setback to this trend which was partly founded on its 1992 Moratorium on Nuclear Testing in the South Pacific.

The wider implications of France's decision are also of deep concern to Forum Heads of Government.

France's decision undermines the outcome of the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC). The decision is particularly regrettable in the light of agreement reached at that Conference, including by France, that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) should be completed by no later than 1996 and that, pending such a treaty, nuclear weapon States would exercise the utmost restraint.

The South Pacific Forum remains strongly committed to a CTBT as a key step in global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. It offers the prospect of ending testing completely - in the South Pacific as elsewhere. The Heads of Government have noted President Chirac's commitment that France would sign such a treaty. They will hold France to that commitment.

Heads of Government also call on France to abide by the Protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

I am in contact with my fellow Heads of Government about arrangements for a Forum delegation to convey to the French Government the depth of the Forum's concern. I envisage that the delegation would be led by the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans.

Canberra
15 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1326
21 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF PERU ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF AN OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations Office and other international bodies based in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request the circulation as an official document of the text annexed to this note.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the text could be translated into the official languages of the United Nations before circulation.

GE.95-62012 (E)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Official communiqué No. 14/95

The Peruvian Government today received an official communication from the Government of France notifying it of the forthcoming resumption of nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

The Peruvian Government protests vigorously against this decision by the Government of France, which is a serious setback to the international community's consistent efforts to bring about a complete halt to nuclear testing and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by means of appropriate international agreements.

Considering, furthermore, that the resumption of these nuclear tests will cause irreparable damage to the environment, Peru urges the French Government to reconsider, in keeping with its policy of favouring international peace, disarmament and environmental protection.

The Peruvian Government also wishes to announce it is in contact with other Governments, given the serious impact of this decision on the international community.

Lima, 13 June 1995

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Press Office

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1327
23 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SUMMIT, ISSUED IN MOSCOW ON 10 MAY 1995, NAMELY: JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION, JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, JOINT STATEMENT ON DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABM SYSTEMS AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, JOINT STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND JOINT STATEMENT ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIME

We have the honour to forward to you the texts of the documents of the Russian-American Summit, issued in Moscow on 10 May 1995, namely: Joint Statement on Nonproliferation, Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, Joint Statement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, Joint Statement on European security, Joint Statement on a new international export control regime.

Could you please take the appropriate steps to issue these documents jointly as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to distribute it to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States of
America to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Grigori V. Berdennikov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the
Conference on Disarmament

JOINT STATEMENT ON NONPROLIFERATION

The President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the President of the Russian Federation, B.N. Yeltsin, at their meeting in Moscow, 9-10 May 1995, expressed the strong view that the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference under way in New York should decide to make the Treaty permanent. The two leaders pledged that the United States and Russia will continue to work to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they reaffirmed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, under article VI of the NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains their ultimate goal.

The two Presidents also reaffirmed that the United States and the Russian Federation will continue to work together closely to promote broad nonproliferation goals. They agreed that, in the newly-established bilateral working group on nonproliferation, the two sides would consult in a timely manner on issues of mutual concern, including how best to fulfil their responsibility to cooperate with other NPT parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while at the same time fulfilling their responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation. The leaders recognized the importance of a responsible approach to the transfer of nuclear-related material, equipment, and technology and to training. In this connection, they reaffirmed their commitments to the NPT and to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, and in particular to the principles that nuclear transfers should take place only under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and only when a supplier is satisfied that such transfers to any non-nuclear weapon State would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The leaders directed the working group on nonproliferation to prepare assessments of proliferation threats in various regions of the world, to consider practical means of addressing those threats, to assess evidence regarding possible non-compliance with nonproliferation commitments, and to report to them periodically on its progress.

The two Presidents strongly supported the concrete progress recently made in their two countries' cooperation in ensuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that can be used in such weapons. They reiterated their call for broad and expanded cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis, consistent with their international obligations, to strengthen national and international regimes of control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, and to prevent illegal traffic in nuclear materials. They directed all relevant agencies and organizations in their respective countries to facilitate in a coordinated manner, effective cooperation to this end.

They directed that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission prepare a joint report on steps that have been accomplished and additional steps that should be taken to ensure the security of nuclear materials.

The leaders reaffirmed their strong support for the IAEA and reiterated their view that its safeguards programme plays a fundamental role in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. They stressed the importance of

enhancing the IAEA's ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and to provide increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, in particular through the effort currently under way to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.

The Presidents agreed that the formal participation of the Russian Federation in the multilateral nonproliferation export control regimes would significantly strengthen those regimes as well as broaden the basis for cooperation between the two countries on nonproliferation. They agreed to direct officials in their respective Governments to address expeditiously the issues affecting Russian membership in the various regimes, with a view to ensuring active United States support for Russian admission to each of the regimes at the earliest possible date.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPARENCY AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation,

After examining the exchange of views which took place during the December 1994 meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in regard to the aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, stocks of fissile materials, and their safety and security, as well as a discussion of the Joint Working Group on Nuclear Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility of further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons,

Reaffirm the commitment of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to the goal of nuclear disarmament and their desire to pursue further measures to improve confidence in and increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction, as they agreed in January and September 1994,

Reaffirm the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security and to develop a process for exchange of this information on a regular basis; and

Express the desire of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to establish as soon as possible concrete arrangements for enhancing transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear arms reduction.

Taking into account the proposal by President B.N. Yeltsin for a treaty on nuclear safety and strategic stability among the five nuclear Powers, they declare that:

- Fissile materials removed from nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirement will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons;

- No newly produced fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and

- Fissile materials from or within civil nuclear programs will not be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will negotiate agreements to increase the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction that, inter alia, establish:

- An exchange on a regular basis of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security;

- A cooperative arrangement for reciprocal monitoring at storage facilities of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements to help confirm the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, recognizing that progress in this area is linked to progress in implementing the joint United States-Russian program for the fissile material storage facility at Mayak; and

- Other cooperative measures, as necessary to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will strive to conclude as soon as possible agreements which are based on these principles.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will also examine and seek to define further measures to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons, including intergovernmental arrangements to extend cooperation to further phases of the process of eliminating nuclear weapons declared excess to national security requirements as a result of nuclear arms reduction.

The Presidents urged progress in implementing current agreements affecting the irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons such as the 23 June 1994 agreement concerning the shutdown of plutonium production reactors and the cessation of use of newly produced plutonium for nuclear weapons, in all its interrelated provisions, including, inter alia, cooperation in creation of alternative energy sources, shutdown of plutonium production reactors mentioned above, and development of respective compliance procedures.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation will seek to conclude in the shortest possible time an agreement for cooperation between their Governments enabling the exchange of information as necessary to implement the arrangements called for above, by providing for the protection of that information. No information will be exchanged until the respective arrangements enter into force.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation, taking into account the threat posed by worldwide proliferation of missiles and missile technology and the necessity of counteracting this threat, agreed on the following basic principles to serve as a basis for further discussions in order to reach agreement in the field of demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems.

The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.

Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.

Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.

The scale of deployment - in number and geographic scope - of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In the spirit of partnership, the Presidents undertook to promote reciprocal openness in activities of the sides in theater missile defense systems and in the exchange of corresponding information.

The Presidents confirmed the interest of the sides in the development and fielding of effective theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The sides will make every effort toward the goal of broadening bilateral cooperation in the area of defense against ballistic missiles. They will consider expanding cooperative efforts in theater missile defense technology and exercises, study ways of sharing data obtained through early warning systems, discuss theater missile defense architecture concepts, and seek opportunities for joint research and development in theater missile defense.

The Presidents undertook to continue a broad exchange of views and consultations on the question of theater missile defense at various levels.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin conducted a thorough review of progress toward their shared goal of a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. They agreed that the end of military confrontation, ideological conflict, and division of the Euro-Atlantic region into opposing blocs has created an historic opportunity for all of its peoples. They emphasized their determination to cooperate closely to ensure that in the future, all peoples of the Euro-Atlantic region shall enjoy the benefits of a stable, just and peaceful order.

The Presidents note that the task of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security now requires dealing with challenges very different from those of the Cold War era. Aggressive nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unresolved territorial disputes, and violations in the area of human rights present serious threats to stability, peace and prosperity. The Presidents agreed that the effort to deal with these challenges must be based on respect for the principles and commitments of the OSCE, particularly concerning democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, free market economies and strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination.

The Presidents reviewed prospects for Euro-Atlantic structures in response to the opportunities and challenges posed by the new era. They agreed that the central element of a lasting peace must be the integration of all of Europe into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships which ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. The evolution of European structures should be directed toward the overall goal of integration. President Clinton stressed that the process should be transparent, inclusive and based on an integral relationship between the security of Europe and that of North America.

The Presidents note the historic task of working closely together toward fuller participation of democratic Russia and the United States of America in the range of worldwide political, economic, and security institutions of the 21st century. It was in this spirit that the two Presidents reviewed steps in the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system through the further development of relevant organizations and bilateral and regional cooperation. This includes the decision of Russia to proceed with its individual Partnership Program for the Partnership for Peace and with the document on a broad, enhanced Russia-NATO dialogue and cooperation.

President Clinton supported Russia's efforts to develop further its partnership and cooperation with the EU. He stressed United States' support for Russia's participation in the WTO, GATT and other institutions important to European and global economic and security architecture, as appropriate.

The Presidents agree that the OSCE's commitments in the areas of human rights economics, and security provide a foundation for their effort to build a stable and integrated Europe. In this regard, special attention should be devoted to strengthening the peacekeeping capabilities of the OSCE and to its potential in the sphere of preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Presidents recalled the decision of the December 1994 OSCE Summit in Budapest to develop a model for ensuring comprehensive security for Europe in the 21st century. The United States and Russia believe that such a model should aim to build an undivided Europe, a common space of security and stability and a system that ensures the widest cooperation and coordination among all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. In this system, all States will have, as stated in Budapest, the inherent right of all States freely to choose or change their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.

Moscow, 10 May 1995

JOINT STATEMENT

The President of the Russian Federation welcomes the reaffirmation of the commitment of the United States to support the Russian Federation's participation as a founding member in the multilateral negotiations on elaborating a new international export control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

The President of the United States welcomes the Russian Federation's reaffirmation of its commitment made during the September 1994 Summit to undertake no new contracts or other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This commitment is comprehensive and covers both arms and associated items.

The Presidents asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to record the details in an agreement no later than their meeting in June.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1328
27 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ECUADOR ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION BY THE RIO GROUP ISSUED ON 22 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS

The Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the European Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to Ambassador Antonio de Icaza, President of the Conference on Disarmament, and, in its capacity as coordinator of the Troika of the Rio Group, has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Declaration made by the Group on 22 June 1995 concerning the decision of the French Government to resume nuclear tests.

The Permanent Mission requests the President of the Conference on Disarmament to arrange for the secretariat to distribute the Declaration to the delegations of member and observer States in the working languages of the Conference.

GE.95-62151 (E)

DECLARATION BY THE RIO GROUP CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS

Quito, 22 June 1995

Further to the decision of the French Government to resume nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll, the countries of the Rio Group express their deep concern at that decision and appeal to the Government to reconsider it and to cancel the said tests.

The decision was taken shortly after the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in connection with the negotiation whereof an appeal was made to the Conference on Disarmament to complete the negotiations on an international treaty totally and completely banning nuclear tests.

The countries of the Rio Group reiterate their concern at the potential adverse effects of nuclear tests on the environment and human health, assets that we are obliged to preserve.

The Rio Group, as the Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, appeals to all nuclear-weapon States to suspend all nuclear testing through the medium of unilateral or agreed moratoriums pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1329
CD/NTB/WP.248
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

Statement of the Group of 21 on a Nuclear Test Ban

The Group of 21 is extremely disappointed and fully shares the concern expressed by the international community at the decision recently taken by a nuclear-weapon State to suspend its moratorium and resume nuclear-weapon testing soon, as well as at the nuclear test recently conducted by another nuclear-weapon State. The States Parties of the NPT of G-21 are deeply concerned that such developments run counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in particular, the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and jeopardizes the credibility of the NPT regime. This is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and undermines its successful conclusion. The Group of 21 urges that a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States during the CTBT negotiations and until the entry into force of the CTBT.

Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted, raises serious questions about the nuclear-weapon States real intentions with regard to continued development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern. The Group holds that consistent with the terms of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear-Test Ban, the CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any technique would defeat such purposes. The Group of 21 reiterates that the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. No tests should be allowed for any reason or justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be comprehensive. The nuclear test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD. In this context, the Group of 21 calls upon the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban to take appropriate measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of the future CTBT.

The Group of 21 has already expressed its concern in its earlier working papers on the possible use of National Technical Means (NTMs) for verification purposes. The Group stresses that the NTMs should not be used on a case-by-case and selective basis. The Group also reiterates that the

Organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data. The judgement by the Organization in this regard should be based on data received from the IMS. Moreover, it should be the exclusive responsibility of the Organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States parties. The Group is also not convinced of the logic of any "voluntary" funding for the International Monitoring System (IMS) since the cost of the verification activities of the Organization shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization of the CTBT.

In view of the above, the Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for an early conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1995.